Officials have many things on their minds, and little time; many good intentions, and some not. It might be worth the time to learn the cause of all our problems and the solution. It's not that we don't have enough laws. It's that officials do not obey the laws that exist.
Here are some observations, a sincere request, and then some verifiable historic facts/evidence, that hopefully will illuminate some of the laws that exist.
Although there are reasonable concerns when irresponsible people possess the power of armed force; there should also be concern when people who are not held accountable possess the power. In "government" there is conflict of interests. The people who prosecute citizens defend the men who use weapons to enforce their actions. In cases when official actions are illegal, police may commit crimes without fear of consequence. "Crime", is the knowing and willful damaging of person or property, in violation of law. The law may be a written statute, or it may be unwritten common law, consistent with the commandments of God.
It is said that ignorance of the law is not to be excused. This comes from the unwritten common law principle that essentially means; ignorance of right and wrong is not to be excused. There are exceptions made for people who are mentally incapable of comprehending established concepts of right and wrong. Ignorance of statutes is inevitable. There are too many to know them all. Many of them are unreasonable, incomprehensible, deliberately deceptive, in violation of other statutes or higher law, and just plain wrong. Not even lawyers agree on the meaning of statutes, nor the judges.
Currently, it seems law only exists if an officer of government wishes it to. All branches of government have submitted their authority to the branch that claims to be judicial. The current judicial branch position on the right to keep arms seems to be that only weapons used for military purposes are protected.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in a, now red flagged case which has already been dismissed in the district, and that did not involve any weapons commonly used by militiamen, said,
"In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a "shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length" at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment, or that its use could contribute to the common defense." United States v. Miller No. 696 Argued March 30, 1939, Decided May 15, 1939 307 U.S. 174.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, as recorded in the 1981 Oklahoma Statutes Annotated, Constitution Article II, Section, 26, said,
"While not contained in the same paragraph with the provision securing the right to bear arms, as in many of the other Constitutions, section 40 of article 3-section 113 of Bunn's Constitution of Oklahoma [Const. art. 5, � 40]-provides: 'the Legislature shall provide for organizing, disciplining, arming, maintaining, and equipping the militia of the State.' Herein is shown clearly that the Constitution contemplates the maintenance of an armed militia, and, taking this in connection with the other provisions and the views expressed by the courts from whose decisions we have quoted, and the history of and ends to be attained by the arms-bearing provision, we believe there is no room for doubt that the arms defendant had a right to bear, and which right could never be prohibited to him, relates solely to such arms as are recognized in civilized warfare and not those used by the ruffian, brawler, or the assassin." Ex parte Thomas, 21 Okl. 770, 1 Okl.Cr. 210, 97 P. 260, 20 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1007, 17 Ann.Cas. 566(1908).
My request? Please define, "civilized warfare", and provide a list of all weapons that may be used therein? Also indicate on the list, weapons not used by the ruffian, brawler, or the assassin. Without this clarification it is not possible for the people to know what they have the right to keep and bear.
The verifiable historic facts/evidence
The Oklahoma Constitution says, at Article II Section 26
�The right of a citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person, or property, or in aid of the civil power, when thereunto legally summoned, shall never be prohibited; but nothing herein contained shall prevent the Legislature from regulating the carrying of weapons.�
"Common defense" is not mentioned in the provision.
The right is secured to a citizen, not government officials
The stated purpose is for defense of "his" home, "his" person, "his" property, or in aid of the civil power (not military) when legally summoned.
Nothing herein contained authorizes the Legislature to infringe the right of the people to keep or bear arms which would be contrary to the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
The Oklahoma Supreme Court admitted that their position was based, not on the words of the Constitution, but rather on views expressed by the courts from whose decisions they quoted, and the history of and ends to be attained by the arms-bearing provision, although they provide no evidence of history other than views of the courts they selected.
From the record of the Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Elliot's Debates) Friday, June 27, 1788.
Mr. WYTHE reported, from the committee appointed, such amendments to the proposed Constitution of government for the United States as were by them deemed necessary to be recommended to the consideration of the Congress which shall first assemble under the said Constitution, to be acted upon according to the mode prescribed in the 5th article thereof; and he read the same in his place, and afterwards delivered them in at the clerk's table, where the same were again read, and are as follows:--
"That there be a declaration or bill of rights asserting, and securing from encroachment, the essential and unalienable rights of the people, in some such manner as the following: --
"1st. That there are certain natural rights, of which men, when they form a social compact, cannot deprive or divest their posterity; among which are the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety."
"2d. That all power is naturally invested in, and consequently de, rived from, the people; that magistrates therefore are their trustees and agents, at all times amenable to them.
"3d. That government ought to be instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people; and that the doctrine of non-resistance against arbitrary power and oppression is absurd, slavish, and destructive to the good and happiness of mankind.
"17th. That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well-regulated militia, composed of the body of the people trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defense of a free state; that standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, and therefore ought to be avoided, as far as the circumstances and protection of the community will admit; and that, in all cases, the military should be under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power.
"19th. That any person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms ought to be exempted, upon payment of an equivalent to employ another to bear arms in his stead.
These are some of the beliefs that inspired provisions of a proposed constitution and potential amendments to it. It's in the record, so there's nothing to debate. Here are the words of some proposed changes to what had so far been approved.
"9th. That no standing army, or regular troops, shall be raised, or kept up, in time of peace, without the consent of two thirds of the members present, in both houses.
"10th. That no soldier shall be enlisted for any longer term than four years, except in time of war, and then for no longer term than the continuance of the war.
"11th. That each state respectively shall have the power to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining its own militia, whensoever Congress shall omit or neglect to provide for the same. That the militia shall not be subject to martial law, except when in actual service, in time of war, invasion, or rebellion; and when not in the actual service of the United States, shall be subject only to such fines, penalties, and punishments, as shall be directed or inflicted by the laws of its own state.
These concerns and proposals led to the following being incorporated into the Constitution of the United States that became effective March 4, 1789 at which time eleven states had ratified, the new Constitution, nine of the thirteen states being required for adoption.
Article I. Section 8. clause 12. The Congress shall have power:
To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years;
Article I. Section 10. clause 3.
No state shall, without the consent of Congress, . . . keep troops, or ships of war in time of peace, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.
These restrictions on state and United States armed forces related to powers delegated to Congress. Powers of government had to be delegated, only the people have rights, but no bill of rights was included in the Original Constitution. In The Federalist No. 84, Alexander Hamilton wrote,
"I go further, and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and to the extent in which they are contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution, but would even be dangerous. They would contain various exceptions to powers not granted; and, on this very account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were granted. For why declare that things shall not be done which there is no power to do? Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed? I will not contend that such a provision would confer a regulating power; but it is evident that it would furnish, to men disposed to usurp, a plausible pretence for claiming that power. They might urge with a semblance of reason, that the Constitution ought not to be charged with the absurdity of providing against the abuse of an authority which was not given, and that the provision against restraining the liberty of the press afforded a clear implication, that a power to prescribe proper regulations concerning it was intended to be vested in the national government. This may serve as a specimen of the numerous handles which would be given to the doctrine of constructive powers, by the indulgence of an injudicious zeal for bills of rights."
Madisons notes of the Constitutional Convention on FRIDAY SEPR 14TH 1787 record that:
Mr. PINKNEY & Mr. GERRY, moved to insert a declaration "that the liberty of the Press should be inviolably observed."
Mr. SHERMAN. It is unnecessary. The power of Congress does not extend to the Press.
On the question, it passed in the negative
The Journal of the House of Representatives of the United States, on FRIDAY, AUGUST 21, 1789, shows that the House proceeded to consider proposed articles of amendment to the Constitution as they were amended to that date. From the record:
"5. A well regulated militia, composed of the body of the People, being the best security of a free State, the right of the People to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; but no one religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be compelled to render military service in person."
The Journal of the Senate of the United States of America, on WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 1789, shows that the Senate, "Proceeded in the consideration of the resolve of the House of Representatives of the 24th of August, on "Articles to be proposed to the legislatures of the several states as amendments to the constitution of the United States;" From the record:
"On motion to amend article the fifth, by inserting these words, 'for the common defense,' next to the words 'bear arms:'
It passed in the negative."
So it is a verifiable fact that the proposition to give common defense as a reason for securing the right of the people, to keep and bear arms was considered and rejected. And the issue arose in the Senate, which at that time was elected by the state legislature, and represented the state governments. Where then, did the idea come from, that the right to bear arms was only for common defense?
The Second Amendment says, "A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."
The constitutional militia is the body of the people capable of bearing arms. State or federal troops are not "the militia" no matter what a legislative body might choose to call them. When men are hired and trained to be a governments' armed force, they cease to be militia. The Constitution secures the right of the militia to keep and bear arms only in that the militia is the people themselves, as citizens, not employees of government. The right to keep and bear arms does not belong to the people because they are or may become militia; the right belongs to them because they are human beings. If the right of the people to keep arms is restricted to those used for military purposes or those used for general security either way, the right is infringed, if only a little. If the people are only permitted to bear arms for the common defense and not individual defense, the right is infringed. The word infringed implies, just a little. It was used deliberately and for good reason. What right would now be known if the Constitution had said, "Congress shall have power to infringe the right of the people to keep or bear arms, but only a tiny insignificant bit?
It is a simple matter to trace the doctrines propagated by courts. A record is made of proceedings, and filed for easy access. Who would believe? The views expressed by the courts from whose decisions the Oklahoma Supreme Court quoted were select views of judges in other states considering the laws of other states under the constitutions of other states.
In Exparte Thomas the Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld a twenty five dollar fine and thirty day jail sentence for carrying a concealed pistol, in violation of sec. 2502 and 2503 of the Statutes of Oklahoma, citing cases in Georgia, Alabama, Arkansas, and Texas. The Oklahoma constitutional provision for protecting arms rights is not the same as those in the other States. Of course they could have selected other cases, even from those states. Here are some found in the Report of the Subcommittee on the Constitution, of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate Ninety Seventh Congress, Second Session, February 1982, Pamphlet on THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary, For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, publication 88-618 O 1982
Georgia case:
19. * Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. (1 Kel.) 243, at 251 (1846).
"'The right of the people to bear arms shall not be infringed.' The right of the whole people, old and young, men, women and boys, and not militia only, to keep and bear arms of every description, and not such merely as are used by the militia, shall not be infringed, curtailed, or broken in upon, in the smallest degree; and all this for the important end to be attained: the rearing up and qualifying a well-regulated militia, so vitally necessary to the security of a free State." U.S. Government Printing Office publication 88-618 O 1982
Arkansas case:
16. * Wilson v. State, 33 Ark. 557, at 560, 34 Am. Rep. 52, at 54 (1878).
"If cowardly and dishonorable men sometimes shoot unarmed men with army pistols or guns, the evil must be prevented by the (p.17) penitentiary and gallows, and not by a general deprivation of constitutional privilege." U.S. Government Printing Office publication 88-618 O 1982
Texas case:
17. * Jennings v. State, 5 Tex. Crim. App. 298, at 300-01 (1878).
"We believe that portion of the act which provides that, in case of conviction, the defendant shall forfeit to the county the weapon or weapons so found on or about his person is not within the scope of legislative authority. * * * One of his most sacred rights is that of having arms for his own defense and that of the State. This right is one of the surest safeguards of liberty and self-preservation." U.S. Government Printing Office publication 88-618 O 1982
In United States v. Miller (1939), when the Supreme Court of the United States made their statement concerning sawed off shotguns they were merely making a statement of fact. There was no evidence in the record for the Court to base a judgment on. They cited Aymette v. State, 2 Humphreys (Tenn.) 154, 158, as if that case had something to do with what was not in the record of Miller. Aymette v. State, was a case in the Tennessee Supreme Court in which the court upheld a three month imprisonment, and $200.00 fine for carrying a concealed knife in violation of a Tennessee Statute. Aymettes' claim was that it violated the Tennessee Constitution, which merely stated that the people had a right to keep and bear arms, but, for the common defense, not security of free states. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has cited that very case in other Oklahoma cases. In their endeavor to uphold the power of legislatures to infringe or violate the right of people to keep and bear arms both state courts and federal courts have developed the false doctrine that only the right to keep military weapons is protected by constitutional provisions. Is it possible they will uphold that lie in a case involving military weapons possessed by an honorable, law abiding, former tax paying, citizen of Oklahoma and of the United States? Time will tell. For what it's worth, Aymette wasn't using his knife for defense, at the time he was arrested. He was searching for a particular man to kill him. He told a number of people his intention as he went about searching. Jack Miller, a confessed bank robber, did get an honest judgment before it was reversed in the Supreme Court. He testified against his co-conspirators in exchange for his freedom. Without his sawed off shotgun, he was murdered before he could be sentenced under the Supreme Courts judgment.
Although the Aymette/State case was not a Second Amendment case, the Tennessee Supreme Court did discuss the purpose for the Second Amendment. Quoting, without permission, from West Laws' publication of the case,
"In order to have a just and precise idea of the meaning of the clause of the constitution under consideration, it will be useful to look at the state of things in the history of our ancestors, and thus comprehend the reason of its introduction into our constitution.
By the act of 22 & 23 Car. II., ch. 25, sec. 3, it is provided that no person who has not lands of the yearly value of <<PoundsSterling>> 100, other than the son and heir apparent of an esquire, or other person of higher degree, etc., shall be allowed to keep a gun, etc. By this act, persons of a certain condition in life were allowed to keep arms, while a large proportion of the people were entirely disarmed. But King James II., by his own arbitrary power, and contrary to law, disarmed the Protestant population, and quartered his Catholic soldiers among the people. This, together with other abuses, produced the revolution by which he was compelled to abdicate the throne of England. William and Mary succeeded him, and, in the first year of their reign, Parliament passed an act recapitulating the abuses which existed during the former reign, and declared the existence of certain rights which they insisted upon as their undoubted privileges. Among these abuses they say, in sec. 5, that he had kept a "standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, without the consent of parliament, and quartered soldiers contrary to law." Sec. 6. "By causing several good subjects, being Protestants, to be disarmed, at the same time when Papists were both armed and employed contrary to law."
In the declaration of rights that follows, sec. 7 declares that "the subjects which are Protestant may have arms for their defense, suitable to their condition and as allowed by law." This declaration, although it asserts the right of the Protestants to have arms, does not extend the privilege beyond the terms provided in the act of Charles II., before referred to. "They may have arms," says the Parliament, "suitable to other condition and as allowed by law." The law, we have seen, only allowed persons of certain rank to have arms, and consequently this declaration of right had reference to such only. It was in reference to these facts, and to this state of the English law, that the 2d section of the amendments to the constitution of the United States was incorporated into that instrument. It declares that, "a well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."
In the same view the section under consideration of our own bill of rights was adopted. The evil that was produced by disarming the people in the time of James II was that the king, by means of a standing army quartered among the people, was able to overawe them, and compel them to submit to the most arbitrary, cruel, and illegal measures. Whereas, if the people had retained their arms, they would have been able, by a just and proper resistance to those oppressive measures, either to have caused the king to respect their rights, or surrender (as he was eventually compelled to do) the government into other hands. No private defense was contemplated, or would have availed anything. If the subjects had been armed, they could have resisted the payment of excessive fines, or the infliction of illegal and cruel punishments. When, therefore, Parliament says that "subjects which are Protestants may have arms for their defense, suitable to their condition, as allowed by law," it does not mean for private defense, but, being armed, they may as a body rise up to defend their just rights, and compel their rulers to respect the laws. This declaration of right is made in reference to the fact before complained of, that the people had been disarmed, and soldiers had been quartered among them contrary to law. The complaint was against the government. The grievances to which they were thus forced to submit were for the most part of a public character, and could have been redressed only by the people rising up for their common defense, to vindicate their rights.
*3 The section under consideration, in our bill of rights,(Tennessee) was adopted in reference to these historical facts, and in this point of view its language is most appropriate and expressive. Its words are, "the free white men of this state have a right to keep and bear arms for their common defense." It, to be sure, asserts the right much more broadly than the statute of 1 William & Mary. For the right there asserted is subject to the disabilities contained in the act of Charles II. There, lords and esquires, and their sons, and persons whose yearly income from land amount to <<PoundsSterling>> 100, were of suitable condition to keep arms. But, with us, every free white man is of suitable condition, and, therefore, every free white man may keep and bear arms. But to keep and bear arms for what? If the history of the subject had left in doubt the object for which the rights is secured, the words that are employed must completely remove that doubt. It is declared that they may keep and bear arms for their common defense. The word "common," here used, means, according to Webster: 1. Belonging equally to more than one, or too many indefinitely. 2. Belonging to the public. 3. General. 4. Universal. 5. Public. The object, then, for which the right of keeping and bearing arms is secured is the defense of the public. The free white men may keep arms to protect the public liberty, to keep in awe those who are in power, and to maintain the supremacy of the laws and the constitution. The words "bear arms," too, have reference to their military use, and were not employed to mean wearing them about the person as part of the dress. As the object for which the right to keep and bear arms is secured is of general and public nature, to be exercised by the people in a body, for their common defense, so the arms the right to keep which is secured are such as are usually employed in civilized warfare, and that constitute the ordinary military equipment. If the citizens have these arms in their hands, they are prepared in the best possible manner to repel any encroachments upon their rights by those in authority. They need not, for such a purpose, the use of those weapons which are usually employed in private broils, and which are efficient only in the hands of the robber and the assassin. These weapons would be useless in war. They could not be employed advantageously in the common defense of the citizens. The right to keep and bear them is not, therefore, secured by the constitution.
A thousand inventions for inflicting death may be imagined which might come under the appellation of an "arm," in the figurative use of that term, and which could by no possibility be rendered effectual in war, or in the least degree aid in the common defense. Would it not be absurd to contend that a constitutional provision securing to the citizens the means of their common defense should be construed to extend to such weapons, although they manifestly would not contribute to that end, merely because, in the hands of an assassin, they might take away life?
*4 The Legislature, therefore, have a right to prohibit the wearing or keeping weapons dangerous to the peace and safety of the citizens, and which are not usual in civilized warfare, or would not contribute to the common defense. The right to keep and bear arms for the common defense is a great political right. It respects the citizens, on the one hand, and the rulers on the other. And, although this right must be inviolably preserved, yet it does not follow that the Legislature is prohibited altogether from passing laws regulating the manner in which these arms may be employed." (end of quote) AYMETTE v. THE STATE. 1840 WL 1554 (Tenn.) December, 1840, 21 Tenn. 154 2 Hum. 154
Apparently the court would have us believe the Tennessee Legislature has a right to prohibit the wearing or keeping of weapons dangerous to the peace and safety of the citizens, which are not usual in civilized warfare, or would not contribute to the common defense, while at the same time inviolably preserving the right. Whatever they would have us believe, it is worth noting that Aymette v. State predates the civil war, and the 14th Amendment, and is contrary to other Tennessee cases, predating some of them. Aymette/State was a Tennessee Supreme Court Case, but does the law rule, or do the judges?
Tennessee cases:
20. Simpson v. State, 13 Tenn. 356, at 359-60 (1833).
"But suppose it to be assumed on any ground, that our ancestors adopted and brought over with them this English statute, [the statute of Northampton,] or portion of the common law, our constitution has completely abrogated it; it says, 'that the freemen of this State have a right to keep and bear arms for their common defense.' Article II, sec. 26. * * * By this clause of the constitution, an express power is given and secured to all the free citizens of the State to keep and bear arms for their defense, without any qualification whatever as to their kind or nature; and it is conceived, that it would be going much too far, to impair by construction or abridgement a constitutional privilege, which is so declared; neither, after so solemn an instrument hath said the people may carry arms, can we be permitted to impute to the acts thus licensed, such a necessarily consequent operation as terror to the people to be incurred thereby; we must attribute to the framers of it, the absence of such a view." U.S. Government Printing Office publication 88-618 O 1982
18. * Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 165, 8 Am. Rep. 8, at 17 (1871).
"The passage from Story shows clearly that this right was intended, as we have maintained in this opinion, and was guaranteed to and to be exercised and enjoyed by the citizen as such, and not by him as a soldier, or in defense solely of his political rights." U.S. Government Printing Office publication 88-618 O 1982
11. * Glasscock v. City of Chattanooga, 157 Tenn. 518, at 520, 11 S.W. 2d 678 (1928).
"There is no qualifications of the prohibition against the carrying of a pistol in the city ordinance before us but it is made unlawful 'to carry on or about the person any pistol,' that is, any sort of pistol in any sort of manner. *** [W]e must accordingly hold the provision of this ordinance as to the carrying of a pistol invalid." U.S. Government Printing Office publication 88-618 O 1982
There are other U.S. Supreme Court cases that speak of the right to keep and bear arms.
In Scott v. Sandford , (Dred Scott) the Supreme Court said that if, "persons of the negro race" were received as citizens they would have been entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens, full liberty of speech in public and in private upon all subjects upon which a states' own citizens might speak; to hold public meetings upon political affairs, and to keep and carry arms wherever they went.
Later, in the record of Dred Scott, the Supreme Court made these observations.
"Nor can Congress deny to the people the right to keep and bear arms, nor the right to trial by jury, nor compel anyone to be a witness against himself in a criminal proceeding.
These powers, and others in relation to rights of person which it is not necessary here to enumerate, are, in express and positive terms, denied to the General Government, and the rights of private property have been guarded with equal care."
After the Civil War and the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, which gave congress legislative power to enforce privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States against state abridgment, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Cruikshank had this to say,
"The right there specified is that of "bearing arms for a lawful purpose." This is not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence. The second amendment declares that it shall not be infringed, but this, as has been seen, means no more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress. This is one of the amendments that has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the national government, leaving the people to look for their protection against any violation by their fellow citizens of the rights it recognizes, to what is called, in The City of New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 139, the "powers which relate to merely municipal legislation, or what was, perhaps, more properly called internal police," "not surrendered or restrained" by the Constitution of the United States." United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542. (1875)
The U.S. Supreme Court, and State courts in order that the right of the people to keep arms may be encroached upon, would have us believe the people only have the right to keep and bear military weapons. Would they also have us believe the supreme law of the land only restricts Congress? While it was true, and still is, that the first Amendment only restricts the U.S. Congress because that's what it says, the Second Amendment protects a right that the Supreme Court has recognized in the case of U.S. v. Cruikshank, as one that exists regardless of what even the supreme law of the land says. It should be noted that the Supreme Court did not say municipal legislation or internal police power may lawfully infringe the right of the people to keep or bear arms. What they said is that municipal legislation and internal police are the powers that have authority to protect the right. What they said was true. Congress was only given power to make laws to enforce that no state shall make or enforce any law abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. Natural rights are not privileges or immunities, and violations by fellow citizens are not abridgments by any state.
Although a murderer might not have the right to live, he does have the same right any human being has to protect his family and property, and the law is the right of all the people to keep arms, shall not be infringed. God help us when all non-government people are punished with the murderer for having a weapon, while the murderer suffers minor penalties for the murder itself. God help us now. Homeland security is at risk, not for lack of soldiers or police, but for lack of a well regulated militia composed of individual militia with comprehension of law. The Constitutional Militia has been forbidden to enforce law, and the courts have denied the law.
Be assured, if officials choose to engage in insurrection or rebellion against the Constitution, men can be found to judge their violations to be law, lawyers will profit from the controversy, and America will follow the path of those who tried in the past, to do good by assuming the station of God. The people of the United States might have forgotten their declaration of equality, but in government by law there are no sovereigns but one. There is no law but his. Crime does not prevent or deter crime. Only restitution and just punishment for harm done is permitted under Gods law. Only justice defined by the people can satisfy. The supreme law of the land is that the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. The reason given by the Second Amendment for securing this natural right is proven true by what has been done in the name of law, as officials take false law into their own hands.
On June 10, 2002 it was reported that the U.S. Supreme Court, without comment or dissent declined to consider two cases in which they could have supported the Second Amendment. One involved possession, by an upstanding citizen with no criminal history and with honorable military service, of an M-2 carbine machinegun like those issued to American soldiers in the Korean Conflict, and a converted modern version of the AK-47. The Other case involved the possession of a handgun by a doctor who had committed no crime.
Back in 1821 The Supreme Court had this to say,
"It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not; but it is equally true that it must take jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the Constitution. We cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution. Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid, but we cannot avoid them. All we can do is to exercise our best judgment and conscientiously to perform our duty. In doing this on the present occasion, we find this tribunal invested with appellate jurisdiction in all cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States. We find no exception to this grant, and we cannot insert one." Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264.
So is the U.S. Supreme Court in treason to the Constitution, or does the Constitution not give them jurisdiction of these cases? The truth is in the record. From the beginning, the prosecution of John Lee Haney has been a conspiracy to deprive a citizen of the United States and of Oklahoma of a right secured by the Constitution of the United States, by color of law. In order to proceed with prosecution United States District Judge Tim Leonard in response to a motion to dismiss the indictment for possession of machineguns said, "Defendant's prosecution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. �922(o) has not been shown to be unconstitutional. Accordingly, defendant's Motion to Dismiss the indictment [Doc. No. 18] should be and is hereby DENIED." The order was not a judgment on whether or not people have a right to keep arms, it was not a judgment on whether or not constitutional process was followed. It was, I think an appealable final decision, but whether or not the prosecution had been shown to be unconstitutional was not appealed. The issues the judge did not give judgment on were appealed. There was no question for an appellate court to answer. What could the Supreme Court do? Say, "Well the District Judge is derelict in his duty to support and defend the Constitution, but if he will give a judgment on these issues, then we can review his judgment."
The district Judge could not proceed with the prosecution without answering the objection to the courts jurisdiction. The transcript of the court proceedings record;
"THE COURT: The Court was waiting on response from Mr. Kumiega. Was the Government going to make any response to that?
MR. KUMIEGA: Judge, I am not sure what the motion says to tell you the truth.
THE COURT: I think it's basic, that the Court does not have jurisdiction over Mr. Haney.
MR. KUMIEGA: Well, the Government's position is you've got jurisdiction.
THE COURT: The Court did not rule on that, Mr. Earley because I did not receive a response from the Government. The Court has reviewed the motion withdrawal by Mr. Haney, and the Court - - the court upon reviewing that motion denies the motion.
The court does rule that it has jurisdiction in this matter, and the Court also and I will issue the written order, Mr. Earley, later today that the Court has also has in front of it your motion to dismiss indictment, and the Court has denied that motion to dismiss indictment as well, so based upon the pleadings filed with the Court has determined that it does have jurisdiction that the case should not be dismissed, and I will file a written order later today, and we are ready to proceed."
So without mentioning any statute, or constitutional provision, with nothing more than, an untimely, Well, the Government's position is you've got jurisdiction, Federal jurisdiction is established?
According to the Dicta in Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393. The Supreme Court could not, for lack of jurisdiction, leave a judgment of a lower court in place that was given without jurisdiction. Actually it was not dicta, but an honest to goodness precedent. Scott/Sandford was a case where the Circuit/District court and the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction. That was the judgment in the case. But Mr. Earley, attorney for the defense, refused to raise the issue of jurisdiction in the Supreme Court. It would put him out of a job. Honest judgment would put all the U.S. courts out of business. And if it was Constitutional 18 USC �242, and �241 would put many federal employees in prison, or to death. I think there is an unconstitutional conflict of interests.